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Abstract
This article presents a novel approach to confidential-
ity violation detection based on taint marking. In-
formation flows are dynamically tracked between ap-
plications and objects of the operating system such
as files, processes and sockets. A confidentiality pol-
icy is defined by labelling sensitive information and
defining which information may leave the local system
through network exchanges. Furthermore, per appli-
cation profiles can be defined to restrict the sets of
information each application may access and/or send
through the network. In previous works, we focused
on the use of mandatory access control mechanisms
for information flow tracking. In this current work,
we have extended the previous information flowmodel
to track network exchanges, and we are able to define
a policy attached to network sockets. We show an
example application of this extension in the context
of a compromised web browser: our implementation
detects a confidentiality violation when the browser
attempts to leak private information to a remote host
over the network.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, firewalls and antivirus soft-
ware have become a necessary addition to the se-
curity components of operating systems, includ-
ing those of mobile phones and embedded de-
vices. More recently, sandboxing and access control
tools such as AppArmor (Novell/SUSE n.d.) and
SELinux (Stephen Smalley 2002) have also emerged,
aiming to protect the operating system from un-
trusted applications. However, even if such compo-
nents successfully protect the applications and the
operating system, in practice they do not guarantee
the protection of confidential data or users’ privacy.
The reason for this is that existing solutions either fo-
cus on mandatory access control resulting in a lack of
flexibility, or enforce data flow policies at the network
or transport level without any knowledge of the ac-
tual content. With the growing number of untrusted
applications installed on portable computing devices
such as smartphones, and the prevalence of untrusted
scripts from remote services executed locally by web
browsers, potential sensitive data leaks are becom-
ing one of the most important threats for end users.
For instance, a malicious script executed by a web
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browser may illegally access sensitive information and
send it through the network, while the current user
may legally access it manually with the same appli-
cation. Current approaches are not sufficient to deal
with such situations as they cannot catch indirect in-
formation flows (Ste´phane Geller, Christophe Hauser,
Fre´de´ric Tronel, Vale´rie Viet Triem Tong 2011) (e.g.,
an information flow from the content of a sensitive file
towards a network socket opened by the web browser).
In this work, we present a novel approach to confi-
dentiality violation detection based on dynamic taint
marking. We extended and implemented Blare, a
model of information flow tracking at the operating
system level. Our extension is based on a network pol-
icy, stating how information is allowed to leave the
local system through network exchanges and which
applications may do so. This article is organised as
follows: we first present existing work in the literature
related to operating system level security, mandatory
access control, firewalls and deep packet inspection in
Section 3. Then, we present our approach of confi-
dentiality violation detection based on taint marking
and its implementation in the Linux kernel in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5.1, we report experimental results
that demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of
the proposed approach in detecting a leakage of sen-
sitive data through a web browser running untrusted
scripts. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss these results
and possible future improvements.
2 Approach overview
We have developed a framework that allows users to
trace how their private data is used by applications,
and to monitor sensitive information that flows out
over the network. Most of today’s personal comput-
ers rely on untrusted third party applications such as
browser plugins or so called ‘apps’. Many of these
are closed source, which makes static analysis impos-
sible (in the case of native code). And even in the
case of opensource applications, there is always a risk
of security flaws or coding errors potentially leaking
sensitive data. Dynamically detecting the leak of sen-
sitive information is challenging given that:
• One application can exchange information with
another using IPC, shared memory, etc.
• It is impractical to modify off-the-shelf applica-
tions; instead, we prefer to implement a reference
monitor in the operating system kernel as a more
pragmatic solution.
• The performance overhead must be small to
maintain a responsive system, i.e., not affecting
the user’s experience and causing them to disable
the security mechanisms.
We use dynamic tracking of information flows be-
tween objects of the operating system in order to
monitor sensitive data leaks. A defining aspect of our
approach is that we distinguish data from contain-
ers : data is the actual information we track, whereas
containers are storage entities such as files, memory
pages, etc. Sensitive data is first identified and their
containers are labeled with meta-data called tags. As
information flows between containers, tags are dy-
namically updated to reflect the container’s content.
When it comes to protecting sensitive data against
leakage by untrusted applications or via malware that
exploits security flaws, existing approaches have sev-
eral limitations. Individuals can use software fire-
walls on their internet-connected personal/portable
computing devices to filter network connections with-
out changing the security policy of the underlying
operating system. However, while such mechanisms
may successfully protect a host from outside threats,
they typically do not prevent the leak of information
by untrusted or misconfigured applications. Deep
packet inspection firewalls are able to identify data
patterns in network packets, however this approach
is too coarse-grained to efficiently track the presence
of sensitive data in network exchanges and is thus not
an effective solution to protect against sensitive data
leaks.
Mandatory access control tools such as AppAr-
mor (Novell/SUSE n.d.) and Tomoyo (Harada et al.
2003) are similarly not practical when it comes to
protecting confidentiality:
• When used in enforcement mode, information
flows are blocked, which may break some func-
tionalities. This effectively renders the approach
unusable for most end users.
• When used in permissive mode, these tools
are unable to track indirect information flows
(Ste´phane Geller, Christophe Hauser, Fre´de´ric
Tronel, Vale´rie Viet Triem Tong 2011).
Figure 1 presents our approach to taint tracking
for monitoring data leaks. A kernel reference monitor
has been implemented in the Linux Kernel and allows
for efficient dynamic information flow tracking at the
level of system objects (processes, filesystem inodes,
etc.).
Figure 1: Network information flow tracking
Sensitive data is labelled at the filesystem level,
and the level of granularity of our approach is at the
file level (i.e., files are considered as atomic pieces of
information). Our implementation takes advantage of
the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework avail-
able in the Linux kernel, and taint propagation is trig-
gered by access control hooks. Our design goals are to
provide a model that is easy to use, does not lock all
the system by default by labelling only the sensitive
information, and does not miss any information flow
(no false negatives). We consider false positives as
an acceptable fact in most situations where sensitive
data is involved and should leak by no means.
3 Background
This section provides an overview of existing solutions
such as firewalls, deep packet inspection, traditional
operating system security mechanisms, access control
and host-based intrusion detection systems. It also
highlights the deficiencies in these approaches in ad-
dressing the data leakage problem examined in this
paper.
3.1 Firewalls
Firewalls are devices or software that filter network
traffic at different layers of the ISO network model.
They can be set up to restrict access to a personal ma-
chine or a company’s network from other untrusted
networks, thus creating trust boundaries (Ingham &
Forrest 2002). Individuals can use software firewalls
on their personal/portable computers to define and
enforce policies concerning both incoming and outgo-
ing network traffic. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
firewalls identify anomalous patterns in traffic vol-
umes by inspecting both the headers and content
of packets. They provide the capability of identi-
fying anomalous network traffic as well as manag-
ing normal traffic. They also form the core of many
commercially-available firewalls and intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDS). Tamer et al. (AbuHmed et al.
2008) present a survey of the Deep Packet Inspection
algorithms, implementation techniques, research chal-
lenges and their usage in several existing technologies
for intrusion detection systems. Some of the high-
lighted challenges include the complexity of research
algorithms, the ever-increasing number of attack sig-
natures (which negatively impacts on performance)
and the increasing prevalence of encrypted data which
DPI cannot examine. In terms of the problem this pa-
per seeks to address, a key drawback of DPI is that
the sensitive data must first be exhaustively enumer-
ated in signatures and this may be difficult for non-
technical users.
3.2 Access control
Discretionary access control (DAC) is the most com-
monly used access control model and is the default on
UNIX based systems. Access is restricted given the
identity and the group of the subject trying to ac-
cess an object. While traditional discretionary access
control lets subjects transfer certain permissions to
each other at their own discretion and remains widely
used, previous research on mandatory access control
(MAC) has led to implementations in common op-
erating systems, such as Linux, FreeBSD, Mac OS
X and Windows. Linux and FreeBSD have been ex-
tended with generic access control frameworks: the
Linux Security Modules (LSM) (Wright et al. 2002)
and TrustedBSD (Watson & Vance 2003). These
frameworks provide sets of hooks for mediating access
to resources (files, sockets, IPC, etc.). So-called LSM
modules can implement various models and policies
within the Linux kernel by using the LSM Framework.
SELinux (Stephen Smalley 2002) emerged from re-
search led by the National Security Agency. It is the
first security module available in Linux, and it has
been designed to implement a flexible MAC mech-
anism called domain and type enforcement (DTE).
Other LSM modules include AppArmor (Novell/-
SUSE n.d.), Smack (Schaufler n.d.) and Tomoyo
(Harada et al. 2003). AppArmor (Novell/SUSE n.d.)
is a MAC implementation available in the Linux ker-
nel which aims to be a simpler alternative to SELinux.
It is used by default by Novell in their products and
comes with a predefined policy, and a set of generic
definitions to ease the difficulty of creating new poli-
cies. When in use, LSM modules block illegal accesses
to resources before they can occur. This is sometimes
referred to as enforcement mode. Most of these mod-
ules also support a permissive mode, in which illegal
accesses are logged but not blocked. Such behaviour
is comparable to policy-based IDSs (Georges et al.
2009). By using MAC mechanisms, one can finely
control the operations each subject is allowed to per-
form on the objects of the system. When configured
correctly, those mechanisms can significantly improve
security by rejecting illegal accesses that would have
been allowed otherwise, and the policy is enforced
at the kernel level. However, there are a number of
limitations with these approaches regarding the mon-
itoring of sensitive data leaks. First, access control
mechanisms cannot block indirect information flows
but instead only control the legality of access to re-
sources. The actual content of resources may ille-
gally flow towards other processes through IPC, files
or other objects. Another limitation of access control
mechanisms in this context is that they block ille-
gal accesses and thus modify the system’s behavior,
possibly breaking functionalities. In some situations,
users have to modify the security policy in order to
be able to perform manual actions, which may lead
them to disable the security mechanisms.
3.2.1 Information flow control and taint anal-
ysis
In 1973, the Bell-LaPadula model was introduced
(LaPadula & Bell 1973), with the primary goal of
protecting confidentiality. It is also known as Mul-
tilevel Security, and systems that implement it are
called Multilevel secure or MLS systems (Anderson
et al. 2001). In this model, subjects and objects are
labeled with a security level, which represents their
sensitivity or clearance. Any information flow from a
high security classification to a lower security classi-
fication is illegal (Bell & LaPadula 1976, Department
of Defense 1987, Foley et al. 2006). Implementations
of MLS try to accurately observe data manipulations
in order to prevent illegal information flows. Op-
erating systems with MLS implementations include
SELinux, FreeBSD, Solaris and BAE XTS-400. In
1976, Denning introduced “a lattice model of secure
information flow” (Denning 1976). She defines it as a
mathematical framework suitable for formulating the
requirements of secure information flow among secu-
rity classes. Most of the lattice-based information
flow models can be represented in Denning’s frame-
work. Models of decentralised information flow con-
trol based on lattice models (see Section 3.2.1) in op-
erating systems such as Histar (Zeldovich et al. 2006)
and Asbestos (Efstathopoulos et al. 2005) provide
an alternative to MAC but are still based on access
control mechanisms. Flume (Krohn et al. 2007) is
a Linux implementation of decentralized information
flow control based on Asbestos labels, and contrary
to the previous models, it uses standard OS abstrac-
tions.
The protection of sensitive information is be-
coming a serious concern. Recent works regard-
ing the monitoring of private information include
Panorama (Yin et al. 2007), TaintCheck (Newsome
& Song 2005) and TaintDroid (Enck et al. 2010).
Panorama is a system-wide information flow tracking
model based on dynamic taint analysis. TaintCheck
dynamically taints incoming data from untrusted
sources (e.g. network) and detects when tainted data
is used in any way that could be an attack. Both use
full system emulation at the instruction level to pro-
vide very fine-grained approaches. However, the main
limitation of such instruction-level models is a very
high penalty in terms of performances, a slowdown of
20 times in average when using Panorama, and a slow-
down of 1.5 to 40 times when using TaintCheck, ac-
cording to their respective authors. TaintDroid(Enck
et al. 2010) is an information flow tracking system
for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones. It is
based on taint marking at four different levels of gran-
ularity, respectively at the variable, message, method
and file levels. TaintDroid has a performance over-
head of 14% on CPU. However, TaintDroid is focused
on the Android platform using the Dalvick interpreter
and therefore it does not apply to native applications,
which represent most of the software present on stan-
dard desktop operating systems.
3.2.2 Host-based intrusion detection
Where intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are often
network related and based on network traffic signa-
tures, there also exist host based IDSs, observing op-
erating system events and raising alerts when suspi-
cious behaviours are observed. Network IDSs are not
practical to track sensitive data leaks for the same rea-
son as firewalls and deep packet inspection, as those
do not have any knowledge of application level infor-
mation. This makes it difficult to define signatures
that can identify sensitive information.
Policy-based IDSs are anomaly detection IDSs fol-
lowing a “default-deny” approach. A number of pre-
vious works exist in this domain, using sandboxing
mechanisms at the language level (Inoue & Forrest
2002) or via Kernel based reference monitors such as
BlueBox, REMUS, LIDS and Ko et al.’s system wrap-
pers (Chari & Cheng 2003, Habib 2006, Bernaschi
et al. 2002, Ko et al. 2000). Similar sandboxing mech-
anisms also exist in user space, namely system intro-
spection (Wagner 1999, Jain & Sekar 1999).
Contrary to access control mechanisms, such ap-
proaches are permissive: they do not block informa-
tion flows and thus do not modify the system behav-
ior. However, they are inadequate for tracking infor-
mation flows involving sensitive data. These models
of intrusion detection efficiently monitor access to re-
sources when subjects access it but they have a com-
mon limitation with access control mechanisms: once
access to a resource has been granted, they do not
monitor any further information flow towards other
processes or system objects.
4 Detection of confidentiality violations
Taint marking techniques along with an informa-
tion flow policy have been used in previous works
for host-based intrusion detection in Blare (Ste´phane
Geller, Christophe Hauser, Fre´de´ric Tronel, Vale´rie
Viet Triem Tong 2011). Our current research builds
on this system for the detection of confidentiality vi-
olations through untrusted applications over the net-
work. This work is based on a subset of the Blare
model, that we extended with support for network
sockets and a network policy. Blare is able to dynam-
ically observe information propagation. Adding sup-
port for networking makes it possible to monitor out-
going information while being aware of the involved
applications and data.
4.1 Summary of the Blare model
Blare labels information with tags. Objects of the op-
erating system which may contain information (such
as files, processes, IPC etc.) are called containers
each of which has a so-called information tag. Every
time an information flow occurs towards a container,
its information tag is updated to reflect a maximal es-
timation of its possible new content1. Such tags use
meta-data to describe information, and a distinction
is made between passive stored data and active code
being executed by a process. The set of all passive
data in a system is noted I and the set of all active
code is noted X . This distinction is motivated by
Denning’s assumption that “processes are the active
agents responsible for all information flows” (Denning
1987). Information tags are sets of meta-information
describing the content of containers, namely any com-
bination of X and I, that we denote as ℘(I ∪ X )2.
Processes are the result of the execution of binary
programs, most likely (but not necessarily) stored on
disk. Recall the distinction between active and pas-
sive information. Passive information stored on disk
is labelled with meta-data from I. Every element of
I has an image in X through a function exec() char-
acterizing the execution. Since we do not have any
a-priori means to know if information is executable
or not, all information exists in both sets. When a
binary containing executable information (i ∈ I) is
executed, the Information tag of the new process is
initialized to (x = exec(i)). This indicates which code
is currently being run by the process. After this, its
information tag is updated after every information
flow as described previously.
4.2 Network extension
We have developed an extension of Blare supervising
network interactions. Network sockets are informa-
tion channels, and we track information flowing to-
wards them. There are different families of sockets,
including UNIX domain sockets and internet sock-
ets. The latter are used to communicate with un-
trusted remote hosts through the internet, and we fo-
cus on their usage by userspace applications. Sockets
by themselves are not labelled, as we consider those
as part of the process memory. Instead, tracking is
performed when processes actually send information
through those information channels.
4.2.1 Network policy tag
The policy for communicating with internet sockets
is defined globally through a unique shared network
1The new information tag is the union of the source’s infor-
mation tag and the destination’s information tag: a conservative
estimate that is safe but may be an overestimation, reflecting a
‘worst case’ scenario where the complete content of the source is
copied to the destination. This is necessary because it is impracti-
cal to observe actual information flows (Zeldovich et al. n.d.).
2Powerset ℘(A) denotes all the subsets of A.
policy tag. The network policy tag is a tuple defining
which combinations of information may legally leave
the local system through internet sockets, and option-
ally which applications may communicate, as well as
which information each application may communicate
(per-application profiles).
A network policy tag is defined as follows:
Pnet ∈ ℘(℘(I ∪ X ))
It is a tuple of sets that can contain any combination
of elements from I (passive data) and X (running
code).
The following properties apply to Pnet:
• Elements of I in the sets of Pnet represent mutu-
ally exclusive sets of data which can legally flow
out of the system (i.e., only one of the sets is
legal at one time).
• Elements of X in the sets of Pnet represent su-
pervised3 code which is allowed to communicate
through internet sockets.
• Any combination A ⊆ ℘(I ∪ X ) in the sets of
Pnet defines a profile for applications, where ele-
ments of I define which data can be sent over the
network, and elements of X define which running
code may send that information.
4.2.2 Legality of network information flows
When a process sends information through a socket,
a legality verification is performed on its current in-
formation tag against the global network policy tag.
The information flow is legal if and only if the con-
tent of its information tag is contained in one of the
subsets of the network policy tag.
Definition 1. For any information tag containing a
set of data S ⊆ ℘(I∪X ), the boolean relation Legalnet
is defined as follows:
Legalnet(S)⇔ ∃p ∈ Pnet|S ⊆ p
4.3 Practical use cases
Our approach covers the following use cases. In the
following, the term labelling refers to the action of
attaching a unique information tag to a file.
4.3.1 All sensitive data must stay local
In this use case, the user of the system wants all of
the sensitive data to stay local. Any network trans-
fer of those data is a violation of the policy and our
extended version of Blare will report a privacy viola-
tion alert. This can be accomplished by only labelling
sensitive data (files) that should never flow out of the
system. By defining an empty network policy tag,
no data can legally flow out through network sockets,
and the user will be notified every time a socket sends
such tainted data over the network.
Pnet = {{}}
3The corresponding binary file is labelled with an information
tag.
4.3.2 Sensitive data may be sent over the net-
work only through trusted applications
In this use case, the system contains both trusted and
untrusted applications, as well as some sensitive data
which may flow over the network only through trusted
applications. This can be accomplished by labelling
all the binary applications on the system along with
all the sensitive data. The network policy tag is set
to match the union of all the information tags of the
binaries and those of sensitive files on the filesystem.
In this case, the network policy tag is a tuple with
only one set.
Pnet =
N⋃
i=1
(S ∪ C)
Here S is the set of all the sensitive data and C the
set of all trusted code.
4.3.3 Per-application profiles
In this use case, the system contains both trusted and
untrusted applications, and each trusted application
may send a different set of sensitive data over the
network. This can be accomplished by labelling all
the binary applications on the system along with all
the sensitive data. Then, the network policy tag is a
tuple of several sets such as:
Pnet = {
N⋃
i=1
(s ∪ c)|s ⊆ S, c ⊆ C, legal(c, s)}
where legal(a, b) states that the application a is al-
lowed to send information b over the network.
4.4 Dynamic policy changes
Taint marking can sometimes lead to a growing num-
ber of false positives due to the fact that tainted data
remains tainted until the system reboots, and infor-
mation flows keep propagating tainted data between
objects of the operating system. This may lead to
repetitive alerts about the same data leaking. Fur-
thermore, the user or administrator may decide to
declassify some information that he or she previously
considered as private, and allow it to flow over the
network.
For this reason, users can decide to modify the
policy on the fly while the system is running. New
sets can be dynamically added to the network policy
tag at runtime. Several situations may occur:
• Only sensitive data has been labelled, and may
not flow over the network. There are no trusted
applications. In this case, the user can perma-
nently neutralize alerts concerning a set of sen-
sitive data S by adding a new tuple S to the
network policy tag.
• Both sensitive data and trusted application’s
code have been labelled, and the user wants to
neutralize alerts concerning one set of sensitive
data S leaked by processes running code C. This
can be performed by adding a new set to the net-
work policy tag containing (C ∪ S).
4.5 Implementation
The reference monitor for this current model has
been implemented in Linux version 2.6.39, as a Linux
Security Module (LSM). This new implementation
builds on a model described earlier in (Ste´phane
Geller, Christophe Hauser, Fre´de´ric Tronel, Vale´rie
Viet Triem Tong 2011) along with our network ex-
tension presented in this paper, and has been written
from scratch using the C programming language. In-
formation tags are implemented as linked lists of 64-
bit signed integers, where positive values represent
the set of passive data I and negative values repre-
sent the set of active data (i.e., code of running pro-
cesses) X . The Network policy tag is implemented as
a linked list of legal sets, where each set is a red black
tree for fast o(log(n)) lookups. Labels are written
in the security namespace of the extended attributes
of the filesystem. A userspace interface is exported
through securityfs4 to load the network policy tag in
kernelspace. Supervised socket families are AF INET
and AF INET6. A userspace daemon reports alerts to
the user via the libnotify library. Userspace tools al-
low us to manipulate filesystem extended attributes
to set and edit information tags.
5 Experiments
5.1 Data leaks through a web browser
The following scenario shows how our new model and
implementation can detect confidentiality violations
by untrusted code interpreted by aWeb browser. Web
browsers were initially simple applications display-
ing HTML content to the final user, but those have
evolved into complex applications running JavaScript
and other interpreted languages on the client ma-
chine, inevitably exposing user data to a number
of real threats. In this scenario, a client is run-
ning a modified Linux kernel with our implementa-
tion of Blare with the presented network extension.
The client visits a malicious web page using Mozilla
Firefox 3.5 and the Java runtime environment plugin
(JRE) version 6 update 10. This version is subject
to the “Java calendar deserialization” vulnerability
(CVE 2008-5353) that may lead to the execution of
arbitrary code by an attacker. The client executes
malicious Java code exploiting this issue and embed-
ding a payload that allows the attacker to get a re-
mote shell on the machine.
Assume the folder/home/alice/confidential/
contains 64 confidential files. We labeled these files as
being confidential, and assigned an information tag
containing a unique identifier between 1 and 64 to
each of them. The information tag of these files is a
set containing one unique identifier, e.g., {1}. This
experiment is similar to the use case “all sensitive
data must stay local” introduced in Section 4.3.1. We
defined an empty network policy tag as follows :
Pnet = {{}}.
In this configuration, any application sending
any of the labelled files to any remote host is a
security policy violation and triggers an alert. Now
we visited a crafted web page http://www.malicious-
host/malicious-page.html embedding a malicious
Java applet containing an attack against the previ-
ously mentioned vulnerability. This malicious page
causes Mozilla Firefox to execute the Java virtual
machine (JVM) in a separated process, which in
4Securityfs is based on sysfs and is used by the LSM modules,
generally mounted as /sys/kernel/security.
turn interprets the Java code containing a remote
shell allowing the attacker to connect to the local
machine. As the attacker accesses labelled files of the
local filesystem, the information tag of the process
running Java is updated with information tags of
the files it reads. At the moment when it sends
information through a socket, our kernel reference
monitor considers that the data being sent contains
information from the files it previously read, and
proceeds to a lookup throughout the network policy
tag to ensure this behavior is allowed by the user.
For every illegal attempt to illegally send information
by the Java process, we were warned by the reference
monitor with the following message:
[BLARE POLICY VIOLATION] Illegal information
sent to socket by
process [PID] running java
5.2 Evaluation of performances
The following is an evaluation of our implementation
in terms of performances. We uncompressed a Linux
kernel source tree and used it as a dataset containing
39048 files, that we individually labeled with a unique
information tag. The machine we used is a Pentium
4 3.0 Ghz with 2.5 Gb of RAM. We evaluated the
performances of our kernel following the scenario “all
sensitive data must stay local” as presented in Section
4.2.
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Figure 2: CPU overhead on SSH transfer
Figure 2 compares the CPU idle time when using
Linus Torvald’s kernel (that we call Vanilla) and the
Blare kernel. As expected, the Vanilla kernel gives
lower CPU overhead during the transfer (higher CPU
idle value). Our security framework adds 30% to 40%
of extra overhead to the data transfer.
Figure 3 compares the memory overhead of our
kernel and makes a comparison with a Vanilla kernel
executing the same file transfer operation. As Blare
is attaching meta-information to every system object,
the memory consumption remains higher by 30% on
average when using our Kernel.
5.2.1 Overall completion time
The overall completion time was 300% longer with
our kernel than with the Vanilla kernel. This limi-
tation is due to a bottleneck at the filesystem level
in our prototype. Extended attributes of the filesys-
tem are used extensively in our implementation with
no optimization. We believe that the overall perfor-
mances of our system can be improved by optimizing
the current prototype.
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5.2.2 Detection rate
When experimenting with an empty network policy
tag, Blare reports all labelled information that is leav-
ing the operating system with no false negatives. By
design, our conservative approach, as described in
Section 4.1 does not allow false negatives. However, a
variable number of false positives may occur, depend-
ing on the presence of indirect flows where Blare over
estimates the actual content. Due to the impractical
aspects of such an evaluation, we have not performed
any comprehensive study of the false positive rate in
this study. This aspect will be further evaluated in
future work.
6 Discussion
6.1 Advantages
By design, our model does not involve false negatives
as our tainting technique makes an overestimate of
any possible content residing in system objects after
any information flow occurs. Furthermore, we do not
only monitor network traffic, but any information flow
between objects of the operating system.
6.2 Usability
We consider the presence of false positives in this
model as an acceptable fact in most situations given
that it is meant to protect from situations which
should happen by no means, based on the principle
of non-interference (Ko & Redmond 2002). The false
positives rate can be improved by filtering alerts in
userspace, for instance any sequence of false positives
triggered by the same event can safely be discarded
after the event has been reported. A more compre-
hensive evaluation of the false positive rates will be
studied in future work.
This model does not replace access control mech-
anisms, nor enforce any security policy but instead
helps to ensure no unwanted behaviour happens be-
tween some defined sets of data and the network. The
situation where a web-browser accesses some personal
information is a good example of our goals: where
access control could have been used to block this par-
ticular access in the first place, it does not prevent an
application from indirectly accessing the same infor-
mation by another channel (shared memory, IPC with
another application etc.). Furthermore, in this exam-
ple we focus on the fact that this information should
not leave the system through the network, therefore
no alert would be raised for an application that ac-
cesses the information but does not send it over.
7 Conclusion
Most of today’s computer software includes a number
of third party applications and plugins from untrusted
sources. Users have no control over the actions such
software can perform, and no guarantee regarding the
confidentiality of their data. This article presented an
approach of confidentiality violation detection based
on dynamic data tainting to address this issue. We
implemented a reference monitor in the Linux kernel
allowing for system-wide information flow tracking.
We presented a practical example showing how it is
possible to detect confidentiality violations using our
model.
References
AbuHmed, T., Mohaisen, A. & Nyang, D. (2008), ‘A
survey on deep packet inspection for intrusion de-
tection systems’, Arxiv preprint arXiv:0803.0037 .
Anderson, R. J., Stajano, F. & Lee, J.-H. (2001), ‘Se-
curity policies’, Advances in Computers 55, 186–
237.
Bell, D. E. & LaPadula, L. J. (1976), Secure computer
system: Unified exposition and multics interpreta-
tion, Mtr-2997 ( esd-tr-75-306), MITRE Corp.
Bernaschi, M., Gabrielli, E. & Mancini, L. V. (2002),
‘Remus: a security-enhanced operating system’,
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 5, 36–61.
Chari, S. N. & Cheng, P.-C. (2003), ‘Bluebox: A
policy-driven, host-based intrusion detection sys-
tem’, ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 6, 173–200.
Denning, D. E. (1976), ‘A lattice model of secure in-
formation flow’, Commun. ACM 19(5), 236–243.
Denning, D. E. (1987), ‘An Intrusion-Detection
Model’, IEEE transaction on Software Engineering
13(2), 222–232.
Department of Defense (1987), ‘Trusted network
interpretation of the DoD TCSEC (red book)’,
NCSC-TG-005.
Efstathopoulos, P., Krohn, M., VanDeBogart, S.,
Frey, C., Ziegler, D., Kohler, E., Mazie`res, D.,
Kaashoek, F. & Morris, R. (2005), Labels and
event processes in the asbestos operating system, in
‘SOSP ’05: Proceedings of the twentieth ACM sym-
posium on Operating systems principles’, ACM,
New York, NY, USA, pp. 17–30.
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., Jung,
J., McDaniel, P. & Sheth, A. N. (2010), Taint-
droid: an information-flow tracking system for re-
altime privacy monitoring on smartphones, in ‘Pro-
ceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operat-
ing systems design and implementation’, OSDI’10,
pp. 1–6.
Foley, S. N., Bistarelli, S., O’Sullivan, B., Her-
bert, J. & Swart, G. (2006), Multilevel security
and the quality of protection, in ‘Proceedings of
First Workshop on Quality of Protection’, Springer,
p. 2006.
Georges, L., Tong, V. V. T. & Me´, L. (2009), Blare
tools: A policy-based intrusion detection system
automatically set by the security policy, in ‘Pro-
ceedings of the 12th International Symposium on
Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID
2009)’.
Habib, I. (2006), ‘Getting started with the linux in-
trusion detection system’, Linux J. 2006.
Harada, T., Horie, T. & Tanaka, K. (2003), ‘Access
policy generation system based on process execu-
tion history’, Network Security Forum .
Ingham, K. & Forrest, S. (2002), A History and
Survey of Network Firewalls, Technical report.
URL: http://www.cs.unm.edu/˜treport/tr/02-
12/firewall.pdf
Inoue, H. & Forrest, S. (2002), Anomaly intrusion
detection in dynamic execution environments, in
‘Proceedings of the 2002 workshop on New secu-
rity paradigms’, NSPW ’02, ACM, New York, NY,
USA, pp. 52–60.
Jain, K. & Sekar, R. (1999), User-level infrastructure
for system call interposition: A platform for intru-
sion detection and confinement, in ‘Network and
Distributed Systems Security Symposium’.
Ko, C., Fraser, T., Badger, L. & Kilpatrick, D. (2000),
Detecting and countering system intrusions using
software wrappers, in ‘Proceedings of 9th USENIX
Security Symposium (SEC 2000)’.
Ko, C. & Redmond, T. (2002), Noninterference
and intrusion detection, in ‘Proceedings of the
2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy’,
pp. 177–187.
Krohn, M., Yip, A., Brodsky, M., Cliffer, N.,
Kaashoek, M. F., Kohler, E. & Morris, R. (2007),
Information flow control for standard os abstrac-
tions, in ‘Proceedings of the 21st Symposium on
Operating Systems Principles’, Stevenson, WA.
LaPadula, L. J. & Bell, D. E. (1973), Secure computer
systems: A mathematical model, MTR-2547 (ESD-
TR-73-278-II) Vol. 2, MITRE Corp., Bedford.
Newsome, J. & Song, D. (2005), Dynamic Taint
Analysis for Automatic Detection, Analysis, and
Signature Generation of Exploits on Commod-
ity Software, in ‘Proceedings of the Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS
2005)’.
Novell/SUSE (n.d.), Apparmor, application security
for linux, Technical report.
URL: http://wiki.apparmor.net
Schaufler, C. (n.d.), The simplified mandatory access
control kernel, Technical report.
URL: http://schaufler-ca.com
Stephen Smalley, C. V. (2002), Implementing
SELinux as a Linux Security Module, Technical re-
port, NAI Labs.
Ste´phane Geller, Christophe Hauser, Fre´de´ric Tronel,
Vale´rie Viet Triem Tong (2011), ‘Information flow
control for intrusion detection derived from mac
policy’, Proceedings of the IEEE International Con-
ference on Computer Communications (ICC) .
Wagner, D. A. (1999), Janus: an approach for con-
finement of untrusted applications, Technical re-
port, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Watson, R. & Vance, C. (2003), The TrustedBSD
mac framework: Extensible kernel access control
for freebsd 5.0, in ‘In USENIX Annual Technical
Conference’, pp. 285–296.
Wright, C., Cowan, C., Smalley, S., Morris, J. &
Kroah-Hartman, G. (2002), Linux security mod-
ules: General security support for the linux kernel,
in ‘USENIX Security Symposium’, pp. 17–31.
Yin, H., Song, D., Egele, M., Kruegel, C. & Kirda,
E. (2007), Panorama: capturing system-wide in-
formation flow for malware detection and analy-
sis, in ‘Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security’, CCS ’07,
pp. 116–127.
Zeldovich, N., Boyd-Wickizer, S., Kohler, E. &
Mazie`res, D. (2006), Making information flow ex-
plicit in histar, in ‘OSDI ’06: Proceedings of the 7th
symposium on Operating systems design and im-
plementation’, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA,
USA, pp. 263–278.
Zeldovich, N., Kannan, H., Dalton, M. & Kozyrakis,
C. (n.d.), Hardware enforcement of application se-
curity policies using tagged memory., in R. Draves
& R. van Renesse, eds, ‘Proceedings of OSDI’,
USENIX Association, pp. 225–240.
